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“PRIVATE ORDERING” TAKEN A TAD TOO FAR 
Brett H. McDonnell*
INTRODUCTION 
 
I am quite a fan of Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws1
The authors argue that we should expand the scope for private ordering 
in public corporations by making it easier for shareholders to adopt bylaws.  
They identify two kinds of benefits from this increased private ordering.  
Micro-benefits occur within one corporation as the shareholders are able to 
hold directors more accountable.  Macro-benefits occur across corporations, 
as they learn from the varied experiments of others.  These are precisely the 
right reasons to push for expanded shareholder power.  I draw upon the 
same values, labeled as accountability and freedom of contract, in my own 
recent work on shareholder empowerment in the context of the debate over 
proxy access.
 by 
D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright, and Marcus Kai Hintze.  I agree both 
with the general thrust of their suggested reforms and with the two main 
policy reasons they give to justify those reforms.  However, I think they go 
too far in the direction of empowering shareholders.  Indeed, while I do not 
believe the status quo is perfect (is the status quo ever perfect?), we have 
reached a point where no major changes to either state or federal statutes or 
rules are necessary.  Both Delaware and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) have made some important recent moves.  The best 
response is to watch incremental developments in corporate practice and 
case law.  Depending on how these go, further legislative or administrative 
responses may be necessary, but not if things go well. 
2
But there are countervailing concerns and problems that expanded 
shareholder power could create.  This suggests that we want an intermediate 
degree of shareholder empowerment that best balances the benefits and 
costs.  I argue that the status quo strikes that balance pretty well, and that 
the authors would upset the balance too far in the direction of shareholder 
empowerment. 
 
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.  I thank Paul Rubin for his 
helpful comments. 
 1. D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright, & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering with 
Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125 (2011). 
 2. See Brett H. McDonnell, Setting Optimal Rules for Shareholder Proxy Access, 43 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 67, 85 (2011). 
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I.  FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE 
Although the values of accountability and experimentation argue for an 
expansive shareholder bylaw power, there are countervailing considerations 
that counsel some concern.  Special interest shareholders (like union or 
public employee pension funds) or those with no economic stake in the 
corporation (the empty voting problem) may use the power in ways that 
hurt shareholder interests.  Unlimited shareholder power to intervene in all 
corporate affairs risks destroying the grant of centralized authority which is 
at the heart of the public corporation.3
The authors point to several constraints on private ordering.  But these 
constraints have their own limits.  Yes, a majority of shareholders must 
approve a bylaw, but shareholders will not always be well informed about 
the interests of bylaw proponents, and the growing influence of shareholder 
advisory services may exacerbate the problem if those services do not do 
their jobs well.  Certificate provisions may limit the bylaw power.  
However, that may prove too blunt an instrument—one that can either be 
avoided by clever drafting if the certificate provision is too narrow, or that 
may block too many bylaws if the certificate provision is too broad.  I think 
the authors are too sanguine that the effects of certificate provisions 
included in corporations at the time of an IPO will be appropriately priced; 
the evidence on IPO pricing does not necessarily support such optimism.
  Overly strong shareholder power 
could hurt other corporate constituencies, such as employees and creditors. 
4  
Director counter-bylaws are another potential limit that may over-shoot the 
mark.  If they are allowed (an uncertain point under Delaware law), boards 
will be able to de-fang all shareholder bylaws they do not like.  As the 
authors note, I have argued before that market pressure may stop directors 
from doing this.5
The mix of benefits and costs that come with the shareholder bylaw 
power, combined with the limits on the various constraints that the authors 
discuss, suggest that the law should strike a balance in defining the ability 
of shareholders to use bylaws to constrain boards.  Stephen Bainbridge, 
following Kenneth Arrow, rightly emphasizes that the law needs to balance 
authority with accountability.
  I hope that is so, but if not, shareholder activists may 
need to push Delaware to follow the Model Business Corporation Act and 
not allow board bylaws to undo shareholder bylaws, in which case this limit 
would cease to exist.  Finally, the limits of Rule 14a-8 on shareholder 
bylaws are pretty weak; of all the procedural limits, only the 120-day 
advance notice limit has any real bite. 
6
 
 3. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:  The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 559–60 (2003). 
  The representative system of a board elected 
 4. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 
152 U. PA. L. REV. 713 (2003); Michael Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private 
Equity, and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (2003). 
 5. See Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison 
Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 262 (2005); Smith, Wright, & Hintze, supra note 1, at 178 
n.382. 
 6. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974); 
Bainbridge, supra note 3. 
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by shareholders does that.  The board has authority to make most business 
decisions, but shareholders elect the board.  Where Bainbridge goes wrong 
is in upsetting the balance by constantly presuming that authority should 
trump accountability wherever the two conflict.7
In defining the scope of the bylaw power, this suggests one or two 
guiding distinctions that I have endorsed in the past.
  To make that 
accountability work, shareholders need to be able to shape the basic 
structure through which the governance system works. 
8
II.  CA, INC. IS NOT THAT BAD 
  Shareholders should 
not have the power to make or second-guess ordinary business decisions.  
But they should be able to create bylaws that set rules of corporate 
governance and procedures which the board must follow.  As we shall see, 
state and federal law have reached a point that reflects this desirable 
balance, and the authors push shareholder power too far in suggesting 
reforms that upset this balance.  Let us look to state and federal 
developments, and the authors’ critiques of those developments, in turn. 
The main state law development, which the authors discuss at length, is 
CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan,9
The first section of CA, Inc. holds that the shareholder bylaw at issue was 
a proper subject for shareholder action under Delaware law.  In so doing, it 
for the first time gave some guidance as to the proper scope of shareholder 
bylaws.  It argued that “a proper function of bylaws is not to mandate how 
the board should decide specific substantive business decisions, but rather, 
to define the process and procedures by which those decisions are made.”
 the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s first extended analysis of the scope of the shareholder bylaw power.  
That case has two main sections in its argument and holdings, and the 
authors criticize both sections.  I find those criticisms off base for one 
section, and on target but ultimately overstated for the other. 
10  
The authors criticize this distinction as unsupported by the statutory 
language describing the general bylaw power.  But as I have argued 
elsewhere at some length, the procedural–substance distinction is in fact a 
plausible interpretation of that power.11  The authors also argue that the 
court “has now invited litigation of the nature of bylaws, without much 
guidance on how to distinguish procedural and substantive bylaws.”12
 
 7. See Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment:  A 
Review of The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 139 
(2009). 
  
However, the procedure–substance distinction is an old one in the law, one 
that many courts have elaborated upon over the years.  Delaware courts 
operate in the common law tradition, and are quite experienced at applying 
 8. See McDonnell, supra note 5, at 216–18; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw 
Battlefield:  Can Institutions Change the Outcome of Corporate Control Contests?, 51 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 605, 613–15 (1997). 
 9. 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). 
 10. Id. at 234-35. 
 11. See McDonnell, supra note 5, at 217. 
 12. Smith, Wright, & Hintze, supra note 1, at 153. 
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general standards to specific facts.  As I have said elsewhere, “Applying 
broad, vague principles to particular circumstances is utterly central to the 
identity of Delaware courts in the area of corporation law.  If Delaware 
courts cannot be trusted to do that task well, there is a much bigger problem 
than just how to develop the law in this one area.”13
Moreover, the court does not necessarily limit bylaws to only procedural 
matters; it calls this a proper function.  That holds open the possibility that 
there are other possible functions.  In addition to the process–substance 
distinction, the courts could elaborate that bylaws can be used to structure 
the basic governance features of a corporation, again in contrast to being 
used to dictate particular business decisions.  Especially if so interpreted, 
CA, Inc. would then reflect the optimal balance of authority and 
accountability described above.  The authors’ suggested changes to sections 
109(b) and 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) 
would upset that balance.  They do not identify any major bylaw ideas that 
would advance shareholder interests at low cost to corporate operations but 
that would be prohibited by Delaware law under the CA, Inc. interpretation. 
 
The second section of CA, Inc. holds that the bylaw nonetheless violates 
Delaware law because under some circumstances it might force the 
corporation’s directors to violate their fiduciary duty.14  It reaches this 
conclusion by referencing cases in which corporate boards attempted to 
bind themselves, and belittles the distinction between a board binding future 
boards and shareholders binding a board.  The authors write:  “It is hard to 
imagine how the court found this argument persuasive.”15  Indeed, it is hard 
to adequately describe how bad the reasoning is here relative to the general 
high quality of Delaware court opinions.16
And yet, the practical effects of this bungled logic are probably not too 
bad.  Shareholders can avoid this problem by including a fiduciary duty 
carve-out in their bylaws.  Such carve-outs do create the risk that a board 
will use them to get around the bylaw.  However, doing so would be a 
blatant slap in the face to shareholders, and boards are unlikely to try it 
unless they are rather desperate.  Moreover, attempts to exercise the carve-
out are likely subject to strict Blasius
 
17
Furthermore, it may be that the fiduciary duty analysis of CA, Inc. does 
not apply to bylaws that are valid under more specific statutory grants of 
authority as opposed to the general grant of authority under section 109(b).  
If so, many useful bylaws will not even require fiduciary duty carve-outs.  
That includes the very election reimbursement bylaw at issue in CA, Inc., 
 scrutiny, so that boards will have to 
struggle to justify themselves. 
 
 13. Brett H. McDonnell, Bylaw Reforms for Delaware’s Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 651, 667 (2008). 
 14. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 238. 
 15. Smith, Wright, & Hintze, supra note 1, at 154. 
 16. I have had a go at it myself. See McDonnell, supra note 2, at 98–99. 
 17. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding invalid 
actions taken for the primary purpose of impeding the shareholder franchise unless those 
actions are shown to have a compelling justification). 
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which was subsequently given a specific statutory grant of authority under 
the new section 113.  So, while I agree with the authors’ recommendation 
that the Delaware Supreme Court revisit its precedent on this point, if the 
court ignores that recommendation, which seems likely, I do not foresee 
huge problems for shareholder activists. 
In sum, the obstacles to shareholder exercises of the bylaw power that the 
authors identify in their analysis of CA, Inc. are not too serious on close 
inspection.  The first half of the opinion strikes a good balance between 
authority and accountability.  The second half of the opinion is silly, but 
harmless.  Or at least mostly harmless. 
III.  THE SEC GOT IT MOSTLY RIGHT (EVEN IF THE D.C. CIRCUIT DID NOT) 
In order to be able to afford to get bylaw proposals before fellow 
shareholders, proposers need to be able to place their proposals in the 
corporate proxy using Rule 14a-8.  For decades, the misbegotten “relates to 
an election” exclusion prevented shareholders from using Rule 14a-8 to 
propose bylaws setting the rules for shareholder elections.  The SEC’s 
recent proxy access rules wisely eliminated this exclusion (more or less), 
and the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC18
The Business Roundtable case strikes down the new proxy access rule for 
shareholder nominations to the board.  Like the authors, I supported that 
rule, although I believed it should have allowed shareholders to opt out of 
the rule in any direction they wanted.  In striking down the rule, the D.C. 
Circuit rather arbitrarily and capriciously imposed a cost-benefit 
requirement that provides little guidance as to what the agency must do to 
justify a rule in a way that the court finds adequate.  I fear that this will 
make rulemaking to implement new financial regulations under the Dodd-
Frank Act
 
does not change that. 
19
Although I regret the loss of the new Rule 14a-11, I do not mourn it 
much.  It was a close call whether the SEC should have imposed a proxy 
access default rule at all, and the rule it chose allowed access for such a 
limited group of shareholders that I doubt it would have been used much 
anyway (very few shareholders in public corporations hold three percent of 
a company’s shares for three years).  Given the stringency of that rule, what 
really mattered was amending Rule 14a-8 to allow shareholders to create 
their own more generous rules, and as mentioned, that change remains in 
place. 
 more costly, time-consuming, and uncertain. 
The authors recommend eliminating the “ordinary business” exclusion in 
Rule 14a-8.20
 
 18. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
  They condemn it as unduly vague.  Vague it certainly is, and 
the SEC undoubtedly reverses itself with some regularity as it decides that 
some previously excluded topics have become the subject of enough public 
 19. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).   
 20. See Smith, Wright, & Hintze, supra note 1, at 185-87. 
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interest so that proposals on those topics should be allowed.  But excluding 
matters that are part of ordinary business quite closely tracks the distinction, 
which I suggest above strikes a good balance between authority and 
accountability.  The exclusion’s flexibility allows the SEC to gauge the 
markets and ask what sorts of proposals seem to be of present concern to a 
large number of shareholders and what kinds of proposals reflect overly 
pushy activists using the Rule in a way that is imposing too large a burden 
on companies.  The resulting uncertainty has some costs, but those are 
mitigated by the no-action letter process.  At relatively low cost, companies 
and shareholders can get guidance from the SEC on particular proposals, 
and the accumulation of no-action letters creates some precedential value, 
which further reduces uncertainty. 
CONCLUSION 
For those keeping score, I have supported the third of the authors’ 
recommended legal changes (revisiting Delaware precedent on fiduciary 
duty), but argued against their first (amending DGCL section 141(a)), 
second (amending DGCL section 109(b)), and fourth (amending Rule 14a-
8) recommended changes.  What other changes would I then recommend 
myself? 
None, for now.21
But these are not huge barriers to shareholder action.  For now, we 
should live with them.  Let us see how shareholder activists use the 
shareholder bylaw power and Rule 14a-8 to propose new bylaws, including 
those governing proxy access.  Experience may show that we need to tinker 
with the rules more.  If Delaware courts use the procedure–substance 
distinction to strike down useful, non-harmful bylaws, the authors’ 
suggested changes to sections 109(b) and 141(a) may be needed.  Should 
the SEC regularly allow companies to exclude useful bylaw proposals 
under the “ordinary business” exclusion, the time may come to eliminate 
that exclusion.  Should boards aggressively use counter-bylaws to neuter 
shareholder bylaws, and should the Delaware courts hold those counter-
bylaws are valid, we may need to push to amend Delaware law to follow 
practice in other states and allow shareholder bylaws to restrict such board 
counter-bylaws. 
  Both state and federal law on shareholder bylaw 
proposals have reached a pretty good set of rules.  They are not perfect; the 
Delaware precedent on fiduciary duty being inconsistent with most bylaws 
is silly, and either state or federal law should probably create a default rule 
for shareholder access to the corporate proxy to nominate board candidates, 
as the SEC tried to do with Rule 14a-11. 
I think there is quite a good chance, though, that none of these legal 
changes will be needed.  The authors do not point to any significant and 
useful bylaw proposals that would be struck down under the current regime.  
If Delaware courts, the SEC, and boards follow and develop current rules 
 
 21. Though I have recommended other statutory changes in the past. See McDonnell, 
supra note 13. 
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wisely, those rules should create a proper balance in defining the 
shareholder bylaw power. 
